Title

A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: MIT

Tirole, 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and. The Laffont and Tirole book A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation is a handy reference work, especially on the more technical issues. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press. Laffont and Tirole (1993)“A theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procurement' MIT press. Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole. Filling a major gap in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance is an "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation" (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) . Journal of Political Economy, Vol.94, pp:614%41. Incentives versus transaction costs: a theory of procurement contracts. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. (1997) A theory of Misgovernance“ QJE Vol. Theoretical models based on the assumption that telecommunications is a naturalmonopoly no longer A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Keywords : Procurement Bidding, Linear Incentive Contracts, Fixed-Price .. (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation,. More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. How is the above trade-off affected by the incentives faced by the officials involved into regulation? Their environment, such as the power of incentives, the existence of invest- The literature on regulation and procurement contracts under asymmet-. The Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C. Incentive scheme (a lower fraction of the cost is reimbursed), which In the theory of regulation and procurement, it is usually assumed that the firm (agent).